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CASENOTE; Tyrrell v. BNSF Railway Company: Is BNSF Being 
Railroaded into the Montana Court System? 
 
Molenda L. McCarty 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 “It is one thing to hold a corporation answerable for operations in 
the forum State, . . . quite another to expose it to suit on claims having no 
connection whatever to the forum State.”1 General jurisdiction is the form 
of personal jurisdiction that allows a forum state to assert judicial authority 
over “any and all claims” against a defendant who has sufficient, close 
contacts with the state—even claims that arise elsewhere.2 In Daimler AG 
v. Bauman,3 the United States Supreme Court held that a corporation must 
be “essentially at home” in the forum state to assert general jurisdiction.4 
To date, the Supreme Court has only found one example of a corporation 
“essentially at home” outside of its place of incorporation or principal 
place of business.5 Congress’s enactment of the FELA does not make 
railroad companies doing business in Montana another example.6 Thus, 
the due process of a railroad corporation should be assessed in the same 
manner as that of any other corporation by applying the Daimler standard.  
 
II.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”) is a Delaware corporation 
with its principal place of business in Texas.7 Robert Nelson sued BNSF 
in Montana’s Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County to 
recover damages from knee injuries he allegedly sustained while 
employed with BNSF.8 In his complaint, Nelson did not assert that he had 
ever worked in Montana or that his injuries were sustained in Montana.9  
Kelli Tyrrell (“Tyrrell”), Special Administrator of the Estate of 
Brent Tyrrell (“Brent”), also sued BNSF in Yellowstone County when 
Brent died, allegedly due to exposure to various carcinogenic chemicals 
                                           
1 Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014). 
2 Goodyear Dunlop Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“Specific jurisdiction” 
applies when the case itself arises out of or relates to the defendant’s activity within the state.).  
3 ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
4 Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 751. 
5 See e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (holding that asserting personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign company having temporary headquarters in the forum state due to a war 
comports with the Due Process Clause); see also Daimler, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 761, n.19 
(“[A] corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place 
of business may be so substantial and of such nature as to render the corporation at home in that 
State.”). 
6 See Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 373 P.3d 1, 11–12, (Mont. 2016) (McKinnon, L. dissenting). 
7 Id. at 3.  
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
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during his employment with BNSF.10 The complaint did not include a 
statement that Brent ever worked in Montana or that any chemical 
exposure occurred in Montana.11  
Nelson and Tyrrell pled violations of the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act (FELA),12 and BNSF moved to dismiss both cases for lack 
of personal jurisdiction.13 Concerning Nelson’s case, Judge Baugh relied 
on the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Daimler AG v. 
Bauman,14 and granted the motion to dismiss.15 Judge Baugh held that 
BNSF’s “due process rights prevent this Court from exercising general all-
purpose jurisdiction over [BNSF] and this Court does not have specific 
jurisdiction.”16 Contrarily, Judge Moses denied BNSF’s motion to dismiss 
Tyrrell’s case, relying on the Montana Supreme Court and the United 
States Supreme Court’s previous interpretation of the FELA’s influence 
on personal jurisdiction.17 Judge Moses held that BNSF “does meet the 
criteria of being found within Montana and having substantial, continuous 
and systematic activities within Montana for general jurisdiction 
purposes.”18 BNSF appealed Judge Moses’s order, and Nelson appealed 
Judge Baugh’s order.19 
 
III.   MAJORITY HOLDING 
 
 In an opinion authored by Justice Shea, the majority held that 
Montana courts have general personal jurisdiction over BNSF under both 
the FELA and Montana law.20 The order granting BNSF’s motion to 
dismiss was reversed, the order denying BNSF’s motion to dismiss was 
affirmed, and both cases were remanded for further proceedings.21 
 
A.   Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
 
 The majority based its holding with regard to personal jurisdiction 
under the FELA on the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of 45 
U.S.C. § 56,22 which allows state courts to hear FELA cases even when 
                                           
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
12 See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2016). 
13 Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 3.  
14 ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761–62 (2014) (holding a state has personal jurisdiction over a 
corporation when the corporation is incorporated there or has its principal place of business there). 
15 Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 3. 
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 9. 
21 Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 9. 
22 (A FELA “action may be brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of the 
residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be 
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the only basis for general jurisdiction is the railroad doing business in the 
forum state.23 The Court rejected BNSF’s contention that Daimler 
supersedes the Supreme Court’s previous interpretation.24 The majority 
held that “Daimler did not present novel law”; rather, Daimler merely 
reinforced Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown,25 in which 
the Court held that general jurisdiction over foreign corporations requires 
affiliations so “continuous and systematic” as to render the corporation “at 
home” in the forum state.26 Yet, the majority concluded that Congress 
drafted the FELA to render a railroad “at home” for jurisdiction purposes 
wherever it is “doing business.”27 Because it is undisputed that BNSF is 
“doing business” within Montana, the majority concluded that the FELA 
confers general personal jurisdiction to Montana state courts.28  
 
B. Montana Law 
 
 Montana applies a two-prong test to decide whether it may assert 
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident.29 Jurisdiction must be consistent 
with Montana’s long-arm statute,30 and the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction must comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States.31 The Court held jurisdiction is proper 
under the long-arm statute because BNSF is “found within the state of 
Montana” when it conducts business, owns real estate, maintains facilities, 
has a telephone listing, and does direct advertising in Montana.32 The 
majority transitioned to the constitutionality prong emphasizing that 
Montana has previously held that “[t]he District Courts of Montana clearly 
have jurisdiction” to hear FELA cases.33 Further, the Court held the 
                                           
doing business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United 
States . . . shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States.”) 
23 Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 4–5; see e.g., Pope v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 379 (1953) (holding 
that plaintiff has the right to sue where the railroad is doing business and that the state forum where 
the injury occurred is without the power to enjoin prosecution of the suit in the state where the railroad 
is doing business); Miles v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 315 U.S. 698 (1942) (holding that the FELA prevents 
a state court from enjoining, on the ground of the inconvenience to the railroad, a resident citizen of 
the state from furthering an action in a state court of another state which has jurisdiction under the 
FELA).    
24 Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 6; see Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___U.S.___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014) (quoting 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (holding that “a court 
may assert jurisdiction over a foreign corporation ‘to hear any and all claims against [it]’ only when 
the corporation’s affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as 
to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
25 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
26 Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 6 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). 
27 Id. (citing Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 49–50 (1941)).  
28 Id. at 7. 
29 Id. at 8. 
30 See Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1). 
31 Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 8. 
32 Id.; see Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) (“All persons found within the state of Montana are subject to the 
jurisdiction of Montana courts.”). 
33 Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 8 (quoting Labella v. Burlington N., 595 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Mont. 1979)).  
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constitutionality of Montana’s personal jurisdiction over BNSF comported 
with the Montana Constitution’s provision that ‘courts of justice shall be 
open to every person . . . .”34 Therefore, under both Montana’s long-arm 
statute and the Due Process Clause, the majority held that Montana has 
general personal jurisdiction over BNSF.35   
 
IV.   JUSTICE MCKINNON’S DISSENT 
 
 Justice McKinnon authored the dissent, writing that she would 
hold that the Montana District Courts lack general personal jurisdiction 
over BNSF under the Due Process Clause.36 The dissent emphasized that 
the United States Supreme Court has made “clear” that state courts may 
only assert general personal jurisdiction when foreign corporations are 
“essentially at home” in the forum state.37 The Supreme Court instructed 
that a corporation is “essentially at home” where it is incorporated or has 
its principal place of business.38 Because BNSF is neither incorporated 
under the laws of Montana nor has its principal place of business in 
Montana, Justice McKinnon contended that there is “no dispute” that 
BNSF is not “at home” in Montana.39 She concluded that BNSF’s contacts 
are inadequate to satisfy the due process standards set forth by the 
Supreme Court.40  
 
V.   ANALYSIS 
 
The FELA enables railroad employees to recover damages for 
injuries resulting from a railroad equipment deficiency or from the 
negligence of the agents or employees of the railroad.41 Although it seems 
anomalous today that only railroad workers have a federal remedy for 
workplace injuries rather than a state workers’ compensation remedy, the 
roots of the FELA stem from the unique role of the American railroad 
employee. In the late nineteenth century, the average life expectancy of a 
switch-man was seven years, and a brakeman’s chance of dying from 
natural causes was less than one in five.42 In response to the dangers of 
railroad working conditions, Congress enacted the present law in 1908.43 
Prior to the FELA, injured railroad workers found recovery difficult 
                                           
34 Id. at 9 (quoting Mont. Const., art II, § 16).  
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 9 (McKinnon, L. dissenting). 
37 Id. (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tire 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).   
38 Id. at 10 (quoting Daimler, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 760).  
39 Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 10 (McKinnon, L. dissenting). 
40 Id. at 11. 
41 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2016).  
42 Thomas E. Baker, Why Congress Should Repeal the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, 29 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 81 (1992). 
43 Railroad Employers’ Liability, Pub. L. No. 60–100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908).  
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because of common-law tort principles.44 The FELA served the public 
policy objectives of doing away with the fellow-servant rule, the doctrine 
of assumption of risk, and the principle of contributory negligence as a 
complete defense.45 Enacted in New York in 1910, the first workers’ 
compensation law was almost immediately struck down as 
unconstitutional.46 Since workers’ compensation was not a viable 
legislative option in the early twentieth century, the FELA was ahead of 
its time and ensured compensation for injured railroad workers.47   
 The statute sets forth that federal jurisdiction shall be concurrent 
with that of the states and that FELA claims can be brought in the district 
in which the defendant resides, in which the action arose, or in which the 
defendant is doing business.48 The Supreme Court has addressed the 
question of whether the Act compels the states to accept jurisdiction a 
number of times. States cannot reject jurisdiction simply because the claim 
was brought under a federal act49 or when the FELA does not coincide 
with existing state workers’ compensation laws.50 However, little 
guidance has been offered to lower courts regarding the applicability of 
the modern general jurisdiction doctrine to FELA actions. If the FELA 
confers jurisdiction to states where the defendant cannot be not found 
“essentially at home,” it has the potential to violate railroad employers’ 
due process rights. Justice McKinnon notably opens up a discussion about 
analyzing general jurisdiction over FELA claims in a new fashion. 
 
A.   Statutes Conferring Jurisdiction to States 
 
 Whenever a railroad is a named defendant in Montana, the Court 
will find that both the FELA and Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(1) 
are satisfied. The plain language of the FELA makes clear that an action 
may be brought in a district court of the United States “in which the 
defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action” 
and that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction.51 Prior to the 
addition of this language in 1910, the plaintiff had no option but to bring 
a claim where the defendant resided.52 In order to save the expense of 
transporting of witnesses, lawyers, and parties, the amendment was 
“deliberately chosen to enable the plaintiff” to find the railroad at any 
place it was doing business.53 The foundation of the amended language 
                                           
44 Baker, supra note 42, at 82. 
45 Id. 
46 Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271 (N.Y. 1911).  
47 See Baker, supra note 42, at 83. 
48 45 U.S.C. § 56 (2016). 
49 McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230 (1934). 
50 Second Emp’rs’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).  
51 45 U.S.C. § 56 (2016). 
52 See Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 49 (1941).  
53 Id. at 50. 
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coincides with the FELA’s underlying policy of rectifying “the injustice 
to an injured employee.”54 
 The majority applied Denver & Rio Grande West Railroad 
Company v. Terte,55 decided in 1935, to determine whether the “doing 
business” standard of the FELA was met.56 In Terte, the United States 
Supreme Court held that a railroad company satisfied the “doing business” 
standard when it: (1) owned and operated railroad lines in the forum state; 
(2) was licensed to do business in the forum state; (3) had an office and 
agents in the forum state; and (4) those agents transacted “the business 
ordinarily connected with the operation of a carrier by railroad.”57 
Conversely, a railroad company that merely owned property, maintained 
offices, and employed agents soliciting traffic in the forum state did not 
satisfy the “doing business” standard.58 
 Per the Terte standard, it is undisputed that BNSF is doing 
business in the state of Montana.59 BNSF owns and operates railroad lines 
in Montana.60 BNSF is licensed to do business and has offices and agents 
in Montana.61 Further, BNSF’s Montana agents transact business 
connected with the ordinary operation of a railroad carrier.62 Therefore, 
the majority properly concluded BNSF was “doing business” in Montana; 
the Court appropriately determined that the statutory standard of the FELA 
was satisfied.63 
 The “found within” standard under Montana’s long-arm statute, 
Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(1), is similar to the “doing 
business” standard under the FELA. The majority focused on the general 
jurisdiction that exists over “[a]ll persons found within the state of 
Montana.”64 The phrase “found within” is ambiguous on its face but has 
been developed through case law. To be “found within” a state, the 
defendant’s activities must be substantial, systematic, and continuous,65 
“as opposed to isolated, casual, or incidental.”66 Under Bedrejo v. Triple 
E Canada, Ltd.,67 significant factors to consider when determining if a 
corporation is “found within” Montana include whether the corporation: 
(1) is registered to do business in Montana; (2) has Montana offices; (3) 
has employees in Montana; and (4) has conducted business in Montana.68 
                                           
54 See id.  
55 284 U.S. 285 (1932). 
56 See Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co, 373 P.3d 1, 6–7 (Mont. 2016). 
57 Terte, 284 U.S. at 286. 
58 Id. 
59 See Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 7; Terte, 284 U.S. at 286. 
60 Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 7.  
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 See id.; 45 U.S.C. § 56 (2016). 
64 Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 8. 
65 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
66 Reed v. Am. Airlines, 640 P.2d 912, 914 (Mont. 1982). 
67 984 P.2d 739 (Mont. 1999). 
68 Bedrejo, 984 P.2d at 741–42. 
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Further, the activities in Montana must compose “a significant component 
of the company’s business, although the percentage as related to the total 
business may be small.”69 
 BNSF is found within Montana because its business activities are 
not isolated, casual, or incidental. As previously noted, BNSF is licensed 
to do business in Montana and has offices and employees in Montana.70 
Further, it is undisputed that BNSF operates trains and maintains traffic 
offices in Montana.71 BNSF claims it has six percent of its track and about 
five percent of its workforce in Montana.72 BNSF also maintains facilities 
in Montana, owns Montana real estate, and directly advertises through 
Montana media.73 The essential factors of Bedrejo are satisfied, and 
although BNSF’s revenues in Montana are less than ten percent, statutory 
personal jurisdiction cannot be defeated on the small revenue percentage 
alone.74 Consequently, the Court properly held BNSF has contacts with 
Montana such that it is “found” within the state under Rule 4(b)(1).75 
The majority properly determined that Montana state courts can 
statutorily assert personal jurisdiction over BNSF because it cannot be 
disputed BNSF is “doing business” in and “found within” Montana. 
However, whether federal or state, statutory jurisdiction is merely the first 
element. The plain language of the FELA seemingly provides railroad 
employees an unrivaled opportunity to forum shop when railroad 
companies like BNSF operate throughout the country.76 Regardless of the 
FELA’s grant of jurisdiction, though, there are constitutional limitations 
on the number of forums a plaintiff may select from, and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should operate to limit forum 
shopping in FELA cases. 77 
 
B.   Due Process Clause 
 
The dissent appropriately disagrees with the majority’s contention 
“that Congress, not the Constitution, controls the sufficiency of process 
that is required to hale BNSF into state courts in Montana.”78 BNSF is not 
found “essentially at home” in Montana, and so Montana’s assertion of 
                                           
69 Reed, 640 P.2d at 914.  
70 Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 373 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont. 2016). 
71 Id.  
72 Opening Br. of BNSF Ry. Co. at 4, Apr. 15, 2015, Cause No. DA 14-0826; see also Tyrrell, 373 
P.3d at 8. 
73 Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 8. 
74 See Reed, 640 P.2d at 914. 
75 See Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 8. 
76 See BNSF Ry., About BNSF, BNSF.com, http://www.bnsf.com/about-bnsf/ (last visited Jul. 15, 
2016) (“[o]perates in 28 states and three Canadian provinces”).  
77 See Helicopteros Nacionales De Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (“Even when the cause 
of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporations’ activities in the State, due process 
is not offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are 
sufficient contacts between the State and foreign corporation” (citation omitted)). 
78 Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 13 (emphasis in original) (McKinnon, L. dissenting). 
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general personal jurisdiction violates the Due Process Clause.79 The 
majority properly noted that after personal jurisdiction is held to exist 
statutorily under Montana’s long-arm statute, the Court must determine 
“whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice embodied in the [D]ue [P]rocess 
[C]lause.”80 The second part of the general jurisdiction analysis should 
also be used in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists when the 
FELA statute is satisfied. The majority’s opinion that the FELA renders 
Daimler inapplicable to railroad employers81 is unpersuasive because it 
does not offer a substitute constitutionality prong for general jurisdiction 
over railroads to comport with the Due Process Clause.   
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
in part that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”82 Although International Shoe 
Company v. Washington83 involved specific jurisdiction, its introduction 
of the phrase “continuous and systematic” laid the foundation for all 
personal jurisdiction cases.84  In International Shoe, the Supreme Court 
shifted the focus to the defendant corporation’s contacts with a forum, 
rather than simply whether it was present or doing business in the forum.85 
Contacts imply that the defendant has taken advantage of the benefits and 
protections of the state’s laws.86 To require a corporation to defend suits 
away from its home or where it carries on substantial activities “has been 
thought to lay too great and unreasonable burden on the corporation to 
comport with due process.”87 Thus, the constitutional standard for general 
jurisdiction requires that a corporation have “continuous and systematic” 
contacts such that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”88 
Prior to Daimler, the Supreme Court had only decided three 
general jurisdiction cases involving corporations.89 Until Goodyear’s 
qualification of what it meant to be “at home” in 2011,90 the Supreme 
                                           
79 See id. at 14. 
80 Id. at 8 (majority opinion) (quoting Simmons Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 796 P.2d 189, 193 (Mont. 
1990)); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
81 Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 6 
82 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
83 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
84 Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317; see also Tanya J. Monestier, Where is Home Depot “At Home”?: 
Daimler v. Bauman and the End of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 66 HASTING L.J. 233, 239 (2014).  
85 Int’l Shoe Co., 325 U.S. at 316. 
86 See id. at 320. 
87 Id. at 317. 
88 Id. at 316–17 (internal citation omitted). 
89 See e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Helicopteros Nacionales De 
Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 
915 (2011). 
90 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924 (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction is the individual's domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the 
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Court’s requirement of “continuous and systematic” contacts provided 
little guidance because “it failed to address what types of contacts are 
necessary, how extensive those contacts must be, and how continuous they 
must be.”91 Again in Daimler, the Supreme Court upheld Goodyear’s 
contacts rule to determine the constitutionality of state forum jurisdiction 
over a foreign defendant.92 There are only a limited set of affiliations that 
will confer all-purpose jurisdiction over a defendant, and “the paradigm 
all-purpose forums for general jurisdiction are a corporation’s place of 
incorporation and principal place of business.”93 There has only been one 
“textbook” exceptional case in which general jurisdiction was properly 
exercised over a corporate defendant with contacts so substantial it was 
rendered at home in a forum other than its place of incorporation or 
principal place of business.94 The defendant in Perkins v. Benguet Mining 
Company95 moved to Ohio from the Philippines during World War II.96 
Overseeing the company’s activities from Ohio, the corporation’s 
temporary principal place of business was in Ohio, essentially rendering it 
at home.97 The inquiry of in-forum contacts thus became “whether [the] 
corporation’s ‘affiliations with the State are so “continuous and 
systematic” as to render it essentially at home in the forum State.’”98 Aside 
from the Perkins defendant satisfying the modern inquiry, the Supreme 
Court has yet to find a corporation essentially at home in a state other than 
its place of incorporation and principal place of business.99 
Assertion of general jurisdiction can only be justified under the 
notion that “justice requires a certain and predictable place” where a 
corporation can be reached for claims to be filed against it.100 Under the 
FELA and under Montana law, BNSF’s contacts with Montana are not so 
continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home, and to assert 
general personal jurisdiction would violate BNSF’s due process rights. It 
would put an unreasonable burden on BSNF to defend suit in Montana 
where it is not at home nor does it do substantial business to render it 
essentially at home.101 BNSF is incorporated in Delaware with its principal 
place of business in Texas.102 BNSF does have six percent of its track in 
                                           
corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” (identifying domicile, place of incorporation, and principal 
place of business as paradigm bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction)). 
91 Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. 
L. REV. 671, 675 (2012).   
92 Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014). 
93 Id. ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 760, 749 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924). 
94 Id. ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 755–56, 761 n.19. 
95 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
96 Id. at 448. 
97 Id. 
98 Daimler, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 761. 
99 See id.; Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448.  
100 See Feder, supra note 91, at 693. 
101 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). 
102 Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 373 P.3d 1, 3 (Mont. 2016). 
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Montana and about five percent of its workforce in Montana but those 
percentages would hardly render a corporation “essentially at home.”103 
The small ratio of a workforce being present in a state and doing business 
in a state are immediately distinguishable from the facts presented in 
Perkins.104 Further, extension of the Court’s analysis in Tyrrell would 
make BNSF subject to unlimited jurisdiction in every state it operates, 
which is neither certain nor predictable for BNSF.105  
“A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be 
deemed at home in all of them. . . .”106 The main takeaway from Daimler 
is that in-state contacts must be compared to a corporation’s nationwide 
contacts, and substantial contacts themselves do not render a corporation 
at home.107 Because BNSF’s contacts with Montana are fairly minimal 
compared to its presence throughout the nation, BNSF’s contacts are 
insufficient for it to be at home in Montana, and—as the dissent opined—
“that is where the analysis of this case should come to end.”108 
The majority is of the opinion that Daimler is not “novel law” 
because it merely upheld Goodyear.109 While Daimler did uphold 
Goodyear, it also notably dictated what makes contacts so continuous and 
systematic as to render a corporation at home.110 The majority claimed that 
Daimler is not applicable because it addressed events occurring outside 
the United States, and BNSF did not cite cases that support preclusion of 
state court jurisdiction.111 However, Daimler clears up the ambiguity of 
what continuous and systematic affiliations of the defendants are, and 
there is no evidence indicating the rule would not apply to railroad 
corporations in the United States.112 The majority concluded, “Congress 
drafted the FELA to make a railroad ‘at home’ for jurisdictional purposes 
wherever it is ‘doing business.’”113 Although Congress may have drafted 
the FELA for this purpose, the majority does not advise what 
constitutional standard makes a railroad “essentially at home” to comport 
with the Due Process Clause.114 The majority further stated, “Our own 
                                           
103 See Opening Br. of BNSF Ry. Co. at 4, Apr. 15, 2015, Cause No. DA 14-0826; see also Tyrrell, 
373 P.3d at 8. 
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precedent on this issue is consistently clear and consonant with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of 45 U.S.C § 56”; however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has never considered the relationship between the FELA 
and general jurisdiction.115 Moreover, Congress does not set the standard 
of assessing due process. The standard is set by the Constitution—not the 
language of an Act. Therefore, there is nothing to suggest that the Supreme 
Court would allow a lesser due process standard to be applied to railroad 
employers.116  
 
C.   Future Impact on Railroads’ Due Process 
 
 When determining if general jurisdiction exists under a federal act 
or state law, the court must look at the constitutionality of asserting 
jurisdiction over a defendant and not just the statutes. Prior the Daimler 
decision, it is possible that the rule requiring contacts so “continuous and 
systematic” as to render a defendant “essentially at home” could be 
interpreted vaguely.117 However, Daimler specifically addressed the issue 
of general jurisdiction and upheld a clear rule for determining where a 
corporation is “essentially at home.”118 Language drafted by Congress 
does not supersede the applicability of the Due Process Clause, and the 
Supreme Court has not implied that railroad defendants should have a 
different due process standard.119 
 Even though the majority holds the Supreme Court has a 
“century” of precedential interpretation of 45 U.S.C. § 56 and “decades of 
consistent” decisions,120 it does not cite one corporate general jurisdiction 
case or FELA general jurisdiction case.121 Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has only decided four general jurisdiction cases involving corporate 
defendants—none of which address the FELA.122 Thus, it is unpersuasive 
to conclude that a case specifically addressing general personal 
jurisdiction is not applicable to FELA cases.123 Now that a definitive test 
to determine if a corporation is “essentially at home” has been set forth, 
Montana should apply Daimler in all future general personal jurisdiction 
determinations, including those under the FELA.124 Failure to do so creates 
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overly broad assertions of general jurisdiction and leads to forum shopping 
and unpredictable results for railroads like BNSF125  
 While the Court held “that the FELA is to be given a liberal 
construction in favor of injured railroad employees so that it may 
accomplish humanitarian and remedial purposes,”126 applying Daimler to 
FELA cases does not disfavor railroad employees. It may limit the number 
of states a claim can be brought in, but it does not take away the 
humanitarian or remedial purpose of the FELA. In the cases at issue, the 
plaintiffs would still have at least three viable options to bring their claims 
under the Daimler standard: the state where the injury occurred, Delaware, 
and Texas.127  
When considering general jurisdiction, states courts must rely on 
Daimler to determine whether or not the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over a railroad comports with the Due Process Clause.128 It would be 
“unacceptably grasping” to subject railroads to general jurisdiction based 
on the “doing business” standard alone, unless the Supreme Court holds a 
different standard for railroad defendants.129 If the courts do not ensure the 
exercise of jurisdiction over railroad companies comports with the Due 
Process Clause, railroad defendants will continue to be hauled in to 
improper court systems.   
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 
 In the words of Justice McKinnon, “A defendant does not forfeit 
liberty or have a diminished liberty interest merely because the plaintiff 
brings a FELA action. Nor does a defendant forfeit constitutional 
protection by operating a railroad.”130 When assessing jurisdiction under 
the FELA or under a state long-arm statute, courts must not forgo 
constitutional considerations. Whether the defendant is a railroad 
company, car dealership, or tire manufacturer the Due Process Clause still 
requires that the “essentially at home” standard must be met before a court 
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